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Abstract  
 Our paper will try emphasizing the effect of the presence of audit 
committees on earnings management within the Moroccan context, and most 
specifically in the companies listed in the Casablanca stock exchange.  
We have adopted previous research embedded in the Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeny (1995) model of earnings management that requires a maximum of 6 
companies by sector, a condition that limited our sample to 27 companies 
dispatched only on 4 industry sectors.  
Given that the companies manipulate the accruals to show the increasing 
results or to maintain the stock price, the role of the audit committee is to 
ensure that this manipulation is to be reduced in order to provide investors 
with accurate information. In the Moroccan context, this reduction started 
appearing in 2014. The years 2011, 2012 and 2013 were marked by a 
preparation of implementation tools of these committees mainly the 
integration of independent administrators within the administrative boards.  
However, due to lack of data, this study might be limited given the fact that 
the year 2016, which represented a year where the listed companies should 
have created an audit committee, was not covered by our study.  
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Introduction 
 Due to the increasing number of financial scandals in recent years, 
the creation of governance committees within the Moroccan companies 
became a necessity in order to enhance their competitively and allow them 
an access to different financial and international arenas.  
 Given that these companies are family owned, the implementation of 
governance committees mainly audit committees was a response to 
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specificities of good governance in international arenas or a requirement for 
multinational companies with regards to their subsidiaries. In Morocco, the 
first code was elaborated in 2008, 13 years after the first report of Vienot 1 
(1995) in France.  
 In addition, to reduce the agency conflicts and financial information 
asymmetry, the audit committee should exert a supervisory power over the 
elaboration process of financial information. Beasley and Salterio (2001) 
consider that the creation of audit committees is a complementary control 
mechanism of the administration board.  
 In this sense, a number of studies are interested in tackling the 
relation between earnings management, information asymmetry and the audit 
committee. Schipper (1989) demonstrates that the leaders’ managerial 
discretion allows them to conceive accounting information in a legal 
framework but with discretionary components, called earnings management. 
In addition to this, Trueman and Titman (1998) find that the relation between 
quality of accounting result published and information asymmetry as 
demonstrated by Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003). These authors 
show that the presence of the audit committee improves the quality of 
financial information published. In other words, the presence of audit 
committees reduces the agency conflicts and asymmetric information.  
 Considering this situation, it was found necessary to study the 
interactions between the presence of audit committees, the elaboration 
process and the financial information mainly the contribution of the audit 
committees’ presence in the reduction of earnings management.  
 To achieve this, before starting the literature review, we recall the 
role and the context of the creation of audit committees in Morocco in 
comparison to other international countries.  
 After that, we will present the research model and the methodology 
adopted in the work conducted. And finally, we will discuss the empirical 
results of our model and we will compare it with the results obtained 
previously by other international researchers.   
 
Context and role of the audit committee  
The Moroccan context of audit committees  
 Audit committees in Morocco were created principally due to the fact 
that a large number of companies were dependent on international groups 
and their internationalization.  
 In Fact, the first report related to companies’ governance was written 
in Mars 2008 by the National Commission on Corporate Governance 
constituted by the Ministry of Economic and General Affairs and the General 
Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (CGEM). This report recommends 
for the first time, the creation of at least two governance committees, an 
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audit committee and a compensation committee in order to reinforce the 
governance of Moroccan companies and be able to fight globalization and 
allow for a better search for other financial resources within the international 
stock exchange.  
 In Mars 2010, another report appeared, but it focused more on 
tackling the financial risks of credit institutions; this report was developed by 
a group belonging to the Ministry of Economic and General Affairs, Bank Al 
Maghrib (Central Bank) and a group of professionals from other banks in 
Morocco.   
 The privatization and the concern to control the activities of the state 
contributed to the elaboration of the Moroccan code of governance best 
practices for public institutions and companies by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance on February 2011. This code recommended the creation of audit 
committees within the public companies in order to control costs and 
financial risks and provide them with governance bodies that will enable 
them to have an access to different financial options proposed by financial 
international arenas.  
 
The fundamental role of audit committees  
 The main aim of the creation of audit committees was principally to 
reduce the agency costs and information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. This role has placed audit committees at the top of the 
organization by being directly linked to either the administration board or the 
supervisory board.  
 Klein (2002), Bryan et al. (2004) demonstrated that the roles of audit 
committees can be summarized as the following:  
- The appointment of external auditors. 
- The evaluation of financial statements through holding regular 
meetings with managers and external auditors.  
- The supervision of audit processes and internal control. 
 In the same sense, the ‘Blue Ribbon Committee ‘report summarized 
the role of audit committees in reinforcing the confidence of investors 
through strengthening the independence of external auditors and the 
supervision of the work conducted by the internal auditors.   
 Knapp (1987) states that the ultimate goal of audit committees is to 
defend the interest of investors via the reduction of agency costs of 
companies characterized by strong asymmetric information.  
 In 1995, France published its first report (Vienot 1) in relation to 
audit committees where the group of work described that the essential tasks 
of verification committees are ‘to ensure the relevance and permanence of 
the accounting methods adopted to establish the companies’ consolidated 
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social and financial accounts and to verify that the internal procedures of 
collecting and controlling the information that guarantee that ‘.  
 In 2003, Spira demonstrated that the audit committee is the body 
attached to the administration board where the principal missions are 
depicted in protecting the investors’ interests and guaranteeing the reliability 
of the information published.  
 The role assigned to the audit committees in Morocco as mentioned 
in the reports published between 2008 and 2011, is similar to the roles 
enunciated by the Blue Ribbon Committee reports (1990), Vienot 1 (1995) 
and Vienot 2 (1999) that focus on reinforcing the investors’ confidence, 
controlling the financial risks and improving the quality of the published 
financial information.  
 
Literature review and research hypothesis :  
 The multiplicity of manipulations in the accounting and financial 
fields imposes an in depth study of the composition of companies’ results. 
These manipulations are the outcome of the number of factors instituted by 
the internal governance of companies.  
 Theoretically, a small number of studies have focused directly or 
indirectly on the interactions between the presence of audit committees in the 
companies and earnings management.   
 However, the problematic outbreak of this interaction is recent. 
Peasnell et al. (2005) demonstrate that from 1993 to 1996, the presence of 
the audit committee and the independence of the administration board within 
the companies listed in the United Kingdom, where managers had more 
interest in manipulating the accounting results, allowed in reducing indirectly 
the strong manipulations in earnings mainly because the earnings before 
manipulations were low.  
 These authors conclude that allowing the administrators (belonging to 
the audit committee) to control the opportunistic accounting manipulations, 
this will affect indirectly the company’s governance.  
 Badolato et al. (2014), note the effects of the presence of audit 
committees on earnings management. They have showed that the status of 
the audit committee as well as its expertise reduce earnings management 
through the reduction of abnormal regulations.  
 Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) studied the relation 
between earnings management and the presence of audit committees for 434 
companies listed in 2000 in the Australian Securities Exchange (ASE). They 
have found that the presence of audit committees limits the opportunism of 
executives via the manipulation of accounting figures, which allows in 
publishing a low growth accounting result.  
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 Another study by Piot and Janin (2007) focused on studying the 
direct interactions between the presence of audit committees and earnings 
management. The authors studied the companies included in the index SBF 
120 between 1999 and 2001; the study demonstrated that the presence of the 
audit committee leads to a decrease in abnormal regulations. In other words, 
the presence of these committees allows in decreasing the abnormal accruals 
or more correctly the reduction of earnings management. 
 Baxter and Cotter (2009) studied the impact of the presence of audit 
committees on earnings management in the American context where they 
focused mainly on studying the characteristics of these committees. They 
found that the financial expertise of the members of the audit committee 
reduces earnings management significantly.  
 Ghosh et al. (2010) analyzed the financial statements and 
characteristics of the companies mentioned in the S&P 1500 index before 
and after the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) law; they found that there is a positive 
relationship between the presence of audit committees and earnings 
management. This presence is materialized according to these authors by the 
characteristics of the audit committees, namely, the independence, the 
number of meetings and the expertise of its members. 
 In addition to this, other studies have demonstrated that the presence 
of audit committees does not have a direct interaction with earnings 
management. This is shown in a study conducted by Peasnell et al. (2005) 
who have revealed that for the companies listed in the United Kingdom, the 
existence of audit committees does not allow in reducing earnings 
management with the goal of reducing or increasing the gains that would be 
distributed by the company. Ittonen et al. (2016) show that by relying on the 
financial statements from 2004 to 2012 of American banks with S&P 500, 
S&P MidCap 400 et S&P SmallCap 600 indexes, the audit committee does 
not reduce the earnings management when it is composed of former external 
auditors. Wan Mohammad et al (2016) find that in the Malaysian context, the 
independence of the board of directors mainly via its audit committee and 
administrators, does not lead to reducing the earnings management. 
 Following this literature review, this paper will try to test the 
following hypothesis in the Moroccan context:   
“the presence of an audit committee reduces earnings management” 
 
Methodology and research model   
Study sample 
 The companies that will be studied are those listed on the Casablanca 
Stock Exchange and are part of sectors containing at least 6 companies. This 
will help in answering to the requirements of the modified model (Dechow, 
Sloan & Sweeny 1995) of Jones (1991) of the calculations of earnings 
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management with the exception of the banking and insurance sector that 
requires a more particular financial knowledge.  
 Besides, given that the Casablanca Stock Exchange only has 75 listed 
companies where 18 belong to the banking and insurance sector and 
considering the limited number of companies in each activity sector, the 
number of companies that respond to the conventional criteria is set at 28 
companies. Among these companies, one is not part of our field of study 
because of the lack of data in the period set between 2011 and 2014. 
 The distribution of the companies by sector is summarized in the 
table 1: 
Table 1: distribution of the companies by sector 
Activity sector Number of companies  
Number of excluded 
companies 
Food/Production 6 0 
Building and construction materials 8 0 
Distributors 7 1 
Hardware, software and IT 7 0 
Total 28 1 
 
 The used date is gathered from activity reports, presentation notes, 
information/briefing notes, IPO notes, administrative board resolutions and 
the financial statements available on the Casablanca Stock Exchange 
website, the websites of the studied companies and that of the Moroccan 
Capital Market Authority (AMMC).  
 
Dependent variable 
 In order to calculate the earnings management, we will proceed by 
calculating the total accruals (TA) to extract the discretionary part of the 
result (leaders’ manipulation). These accruals correspond to the difference 
between the net income (RN) and the operating cash flow (CFO). 
 TA = RN – CFO 
 For each company i and year t, we calculate the total accruals (TA) 
by the following formula:  
 TAit = ∆BFRit - DAPit 
With:  
i = 1 à 27 and t = 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 
∆BFR = Change in need of working capital calculated on a gross basis and 
load capacities to distribute 
DAP = Amortization, provisions and impairment 
To be able to determine the non-discretionary part of the result, we will 
calculate the non-discretionary accruals by relying on the modified model of 
(Dechow, Sloan & Sweeny 1995) and Jones (1991) using the 5 figures ISIN 
code and a minimum of 6 companies.   
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 For this purpose, we will use the following formula for each activity sector j 
and year t:  
NDAjt = αjt + β.IMMOjt + γ1 ∆(CA – CLIENTS) jt + εjt 
With:  
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals by company  
IMMO = gross intangible assets + deferred charges  
CA = sales’ figures 
CLIENTS = gross accounts receivable 
 In addition, the abnormal discretionary part of the result 
(discretionary accruals, DAC) is obtained via the difference between the 
accruals’ total (TA) and the non-discretionary accruals as calculated by the 
Jones’ modified model.  
We as a result obtain our dependent variable via the following formula:  
DACit = TAit – [αit + β.IMMOit + γ1 ∆(CA – CLIENTS) it + it] 
 
Independent variables  
 PCA (Presence of an Audit Committee): binary variable coded 1 if 
the company has an audit committee and 0 if it does not.  
 NDA: The non-discretionary accruals by company. 
 SIT: Dummy, 1 if the company is introduced in the stock exchange 
where it has proceeded to an increase in capital or a mandatory emission and 
0 if it does not.  
 END: Indebtedness corresponds to debts and equity.  
 ACDIRIG: Is the percentage held by the leaders in the company’s 
capital.  
 SECT: Dummy representing the activity sector gathered in our 
empirical study.  
 
Control variables 
 TAILLE: The firm Size: Natural algorithm of total assets 
 TAILLECA: The size of the administration board is equal to the 
natural algorithm of administration board’s number of members. 
 ROA: Company's economic profitability corresponds to EBIT / 
Total assets 
 INDEPCONSEIL: Proportion of independent members on the 
board: percentage (%) of independent administrators/directors on the 
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Study model  
 In order to study our hypothesis, we used the following model:  
DACit = β1 PCAit + β2 ENDit + β3 SITit + β5 NDAit + β6 TAILLECAit + β7 
SECTit + β8 INDEPCONSEILit + β9 TAILLEit + β11 ROAit + β12 
ACDIRIGit  + εit 
With i representing the order of the company listed in the stock exchange 
and t representing the year 
ε : Specification error   
 
Empirical results and discussions 
 Exploring the variables explained by the tools of descriptive statistics 
allows in developing the following Table 2:  
Table 2: descriptive statistics of variable DAC. (** present respectively the bilateral critical 








Median Nullity (t-stat) 
DAC 108 -3,07 0,43 -0,07 0,35 -0,03 -2,212 ** 
 
 Exploring the variable throughout the period, discretionary accruals 
for each company listed on the Casablanca stock exchange allows in lifting a 
net loss on average and median. This tendency is to be examined by adopting 
an annual cross section. 
 Table 3 summarizes the principal characteristics of central tendency 
and annual dispersion of the variable DAC.  
Table 3: descriptive statistics by year of the variable DAC 
Years N Minimum Maximum Median Average Standard Deviation  
coefficient of variation 
 
2011 27 -0,82 0,20 -0,06 -0,08 0,19 -2,36 
2012 27 -0,43 0,43 -0,06 -0,07 0,20 -2,93 
2013 27 -0,47 0,30 -0,02 -0,03 0,16 -5,90 
2014 27 -3,07 0,43 0,01 -0,12 0,63 -5,20 
 
 In this evolution, the year 2013 presents the best results in terms of 
average, but with a relative dispersion of 0,16. By making use of the 
calculations of coefficient of variation, we see that this year corresponds to 
the greatest relative variability (5.90 in absolute value). This annual 
fluctuation encourages us to explore the variability of annual DAC through 
the model we presented earlier. This model is related to the hypothesis that 
we are trying to prove/confirm and that states that the presence of the audit 
committee reduces earnings management. Relying on the annual study was 
driven by exploring the explanation of the variable studied ‘DAC’.  
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 To achieve this, we proceed by multiple regressions as it is depicted 
in the Stepwise regression. The results of these regressions are presented as 
the following:  
Table 4: exploring the annual variable DAC: the multiple regressions’ results (Stepwise 
method) (*, * * present respectively the bilateral critical probability less than 5% and 1%). 
Year explanatory variable Coefficient β t-stat 
2011 ROA -0,953 -2,338 * 
2012 INDEPCONSEIL -0,432 -2,822* * 
2013 INDEPCONSEIL -0,268 -2,107 *  
2014 PCA -0,437 -2,212 *  
 
 By analyzing this table, it appears that there is a significant awareness 
by the Moroccan companies listed on the Stock exchange regarding the need 
for transparency. A consciousness that is expressed in terms of interest to 
display the signs of transparency and lack of accounting manipulations. This 
tendency came true on 2014 through the confirmation of the hypothesis of 
our analysis. This tendency also should be put into perspective with the 
Moroccan companies. In fact, as a characteristic that is existent in all 
Moroccan companies even the ones listed in the stock exchange, the family 
aspect remains a synonym for opacity, discretion and accounting 
manipulations. This opacity according to Howorth and Weshtead (2003) is 
due to the lack of integration of financial techniques as they should be in the 
family-run businesses, which is an outcome of the unwillingness of family 
leaders.  
 Equally, and in the Tunisian context that is similar to that of 
morocco, Elleuch Hamza (2012) shows that all family run companies rely on 
earnings management mainly to maintain the stock price. In addition to this, 
our analysis demonstrates that earnings management was improved through 
the financial profitability. As a consequence, and starting from the year 2013, 
this latter led to the creation of good governance mechanisms, such as the 
independence of the administration board, which means that the independent 
administrators are appointed within the board, regardless of the family nature 
of the Moroccan companies.  
 The result of this independence is the creation of audit committees, 
which explains the presence of our PCA variable in 2014 as an explanatory 
variable of earnings management. This variable should be analyzed as a 
tendency of Moroccan companies to appropriate transparency tools mainly 
through an audit committee.  
 This pushes us to ask a question regarding ‘tangible’ explanation of 
dictionary results with the retained variables. The fact that year after year 
there exists an overlap in the persistence in the explanation of DAC variable 
is likely linked to a clear tendency to observe the respect of a certain order or 
European Scientific Journal February 2017 edition Vol.13, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
234 
an ethic in an accounting environment.  In fact, the tendency towards good 
governance is confirmed by the absence of accounting manipulations in the 
companies that generally have a family nature. Focusing on this 
characteristic leads finding plausible risks of manipulations in accounting 
statements in a less transparent environment as the case in family run 
companies especially when it comes to accounting secrets as mentioned by 
Vuillermot-Febvet (2015) for France’s Paribas.  
 This must be, however, relativized with the peremptory norm 
established since 2016 following the amendment of the law on limited 
companies, demanding to follow a set of rules of good governance for 
companies making public offerings, such as the audit Committee in order to 
protect the interests of small investors and ensure greater transparency in the 
management of listed companies. Is there then a clear trend of companies 
studied to prepare for such a condition of transparency as required by good 
governance practices? The question remains open since the study period does 
not apply to the year 2016 due to the lack of data for analysis.  
 Beyond what is advanced and in principle, it is worth noting that the 
presence of the audit committee is identified as one of the mechanisms 
guaranteeing reliability of financial information and therefore those related 
to earnings management. It should be noted in this regard that during the 
studied period, the number of publicly listed companies that claim to have an 
audit committee are nine in 27, one-third of our sample. The relevance 
related to the hypothesis of the impact of the presence of the audit committee 
on earnings management as assessed through the discretionary accruals by 
company seems to gradually build through a tendency to adopt more 
transparent rules. 
 Another note is to raise, concerns the signs of the variables selected 
after annual regressions: the β coefficients all have a negative sign. The 
variables actually act in the direction of reducing earnings management. This 
is confirmed by many researchers (Piot and Janin 2004, 2007; Zarai and 
Bettabai 2007; Bouaziz and Triki 2012). Similarly, this earnings 
management reduction grants in part with the formulation of the hypothesis 
to be tested. The hypothesis was verified for the year 2014, which leads us to 
infer that there is a modest trend towards the establishment of audit 




 In this study, we have tried to examine the impact of the presence of 
audit committees on earnings management and test it empirically in the 
Moroccan companies listed in the Casablanca stock exchange. This model 
allowed us to deduct that the impact of audit committees started appearing in 
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2014. This situation is the result of the improvement of the financial return of 
the companies studied, which allowed for a gradual adoption of governance 
mechanisms mainly through the integration of independent administrators in 
the administration boards as we found in the years 2012 and 2013 and 
through the implementation of audit committees in 2014. 
 In addition, in the growing openness context marked by the 
occurrence of multiple risks, imposing new challenges and offering many 
opportunities, complying with a number of international standards with 
regards to good governance and accounting and financial transparency, 
seems to set the path for the Moroccan companies. However, this tendency is 
still considered limited for it is anchored on companies that are family based. 
This tendency can be also interpreted as a preparation for these companies to 
be able to adopt the new law on anonymous companies dictating the creation 
of audit committees, which will help in the fight against opacity and 
accounting manipulations.  
 Following the example of previous studies, we were able to confirm 
that audit committees reduce earnings management, but this confirmation 
does not appear to be satisfying because it concerns only the year 2014 and 
there was a lack of data in the year 2016 to measure the impact of these 
committees on earnings management for the companies that do not follow 
the new regulations.  
 Finally, this study allows managers and various stakeholders to 
understand the importance of setting up governance mechanisms mainly the 
audit committee in the earnings management and its role in protecting the 
interests of shareholders. However, the results of these studies push us to ask 
an important question: does the effectiveness of the audit committee 
influence the earnings management? 
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